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The European Union in Africa: The Linkage Between Security,
Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective
Niagalé Bagoyoko and Marie V. Gibert
Summary
The international community currently favours an approach to development that
stresses a triangular linkage between security, good governance and economic
development. This approach clearly informs the European Union’s agenda in Africa,
which has progressively integrated governance and security elements. This paper
will show that this agenda is at least as much determined by the bureaucratic and
national affiliations of the concerned EU actors as it is by African realities and inter-
national trends. African security indeed triggers a competition between the 
different European institutions, eager to be the driving force for a policy that can
offer some additional resources and autonomy. The consistency and the credibility
of the EU security policy in Africa will therefore depend on the responses provided
to these institutional rivalries.
Keywords: European Union, Africa, security, institutions, member-states.
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Paris. She now concentrates on the interface between security and development,
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French and American Security Policies in West Africa; sub-regional security 
mechanisms in West Africa (ECOWAS); Peacekeeping and military reforms in
Africa; European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Africa; inter-agencies and
multilateral processes in post-conflict environments. 
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1 This is in reference to the edited volume by Evans et al. (1985).
2 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,
drafted under the responsibilities of EU High Representative Javier Solana, 12 December
2003. 
1 Introduction
The international community has been, over the last two decades, developing a
holistic approach to development that stresses the linkage between security, good
governance and economic development. The idea that drives this triangular
approach is that development can only be achieved in a secure and democratic
environment, conducive to long-term investments. This evolution can be traced
back to the early 1990s, when political conditionality was added to what were 
formerly essentially economic development programmes (Robinson 1993). Shortly
thereafter, a security dimension was added to the ‘good governance–economic
development’ nexus, which came with a new diagnosis. It is now assumed that
conflict and under-development are rooted in state failure and that in order to 
prevent future crises, state weakness must be addressed through broad institutional
reforms. The international community thus attempts to ‘bring the state back in’,1
i.e. to re-establish its authority through capacity-building reforms. 
The risks and limits entailed by this type of holistic approach are increasingly high-
lighted. Some argue, in particular, that the merging of development and security
programmes is likely to promote a more military-based approach to development
programmes, thus underlining the growing risk that traditional military assistance be
included in development budgets (Châtaigner 2004; Duffield 2001). Others 
question the uncritically accepted link between democracy and political stability,
insisting that democratisation often brings about instability and can thus jeopardise
a state’s developmental strategy (Mansfield and Snyder 1995).
In spite of such reservations, the above-described understanding of the links
between development, good governance and security clearly informs the European
Union’s policy agenda in Africa. Through the so-called ‘multi-functional approach’
outlined in the European Security Strategy2 – the so-called ‘Solana Document’,
adopted in December 2003 – the EU is also promoting a holistic approach, where
security, economic development and democracy are seen as essential contributions
to the generation of political stability in the EU’s international environment. In
doing so, the EU positions itself as a major actor on the international scene, one
that can propose a multi-dimensional approach to crisis management and therefore
claim the status of international power (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Piening 1997;
Soeterdorp 1999). The EU insists on its added value as a multi-institutional organisa-
tion likely to provide all types of crisis management tools – civilian and military as
well as humanitarian – within a unique framework. Because of the multiplicity of
the problems it is facing – war, poverty, humanitarian catastrophes, etc. – the
African continent fits with this multi-functional approach.
This case study of the EU security policy in Africa shows that the linkage between
security, governance and development relies for a large part on institutional 
dynamics. This paper will therefore focus on these dynamics and on the bureau-
cratic affiliations of the concerned EU actors, notwithstanding the fact that the
EU’s security agenda in Africa is also clearly determined by African realities. African
security can be seen as a field where EU actors are improving their institutional
capacities: in fact, EU African security policy is often driven by internal power
relations. The importance of these institutional dynamics can be seen through a
threefold process:
l First, African security is a field likely to provide a new legitimacy for
development policies led by the European Community (EC), which is 
responsible for the management of first pillar3 activities;
l Second, African security is a field of experimentation for the institutional actors
responsible for the definition and implementation of the CFSP (Common 
Foreign and Security Policy) – the so-called second pillar;
l Third, African security is a field of Europeanisation for traditionally bilateral 
member-state security policies.  
In fact, the consistency and the credibility of the EU security policy in Africa will
depend on the convergence between these three processes. 
2 African security, a field of re-
legitimisation for the European 
Commission?
For some years now, a discourse that emphasises the role of security as a pre-
condition for development has emerged within the EU’s community institutions.
The first EU document focusing on African conflicts was proposed by the
Commission (European Commission 1996a) and promoted the notion of ‘structural
stability’, which underlined the key role played by development in the prevention
IDS WORKING PAPER 284
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3 The concept of pillars is generally used in connection with the Treaty on European Union, 
signed in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997. Three pillars form the basic structure of the 
European Union, namely:
1. The first or ‘Community’ pillar concerns economic, social and environmental policies. 
2. The second or ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) pillar concerns foreign 
policy and military matters. 
3. The third or ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ (PJCC) pillar concerns 
cooperation in the fight against crime. 
The three pillars function on the basis of different decision-making procedures: the Community
procedure for the first pillar, and the intergovernmental procedure for the other two. In the case
of the first pillar, only the Commission can submit proposals to the Council and Parliament, and
a qualified majority is sufficient for a Council act to be adopted. In the case of the second and
third pillars, this right of initiative is shared between the Commission and the member-states,
and unanimity in the Council is generally necessary.
and regulation of African conflicts. Increasing involvement in African conflict 
management issues constitutes a means for the Commission and its Directorate
General Development (DG Dev), to respond to the doubts expressed about the
efficiency of its development strategies in Africa (European Commission 1996b,
2000), and the general validity of development aid (Lister 1998a). Sub-Saharan
Africa is increasingly perceived as a difficult field for the promotion of economic
and social development through aid. This explains the growing attention given to
conflict prevention and management through military means (Olsen 2002). This
security angle in the approach to development is determined by the interests of
some Directorates General (DGs) within the Commission – DG Dev, in particular 4
– in defending their privileged geographic area of intervention and investing in a
functional field in which they do not traditionally intervene. From the early 2000s,
the EC has thus been entering into the African security field on tiptoes, through
the politicisation and securitisation of its development policy. 
2.1 Politicisation and securitisation of EC policies
Whereas in the past relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa had long
been reduced to the sole issues of trade and development cooperation through the
Yaoundé and subsequent Lomé partnership agreements between the EU and the
Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states (GEMDEV 2000),5 nowadays they
are being increasingly politicised and securitised as was apparent in the two last
Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000.6
The adoption, by the EU, of the comprehensive approach that links good 
governance and development is evident in the Cotonou Agreement. Human rights,
democratic principles and the rule of law are defined as ‘essential elements’ in the
Cotonou Agreement: a violation of any of these elements may lead to a suspension
of EU assistance and trade cooperation with the concerned ACP country.7
Meanwhile, the very first article of the Cotonou Agreement closes the 
11 
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4 DG Dev often tends to consider Africa as its ‘exclusive territory’. See Dimier (2002, 2003). 
5 Some have even considered aid programmes to be a cornerstone in the European 
integration process (Lister 1998b).
6 It is important here to put the stress on the EU institutional sharing of responsibility. While 
the Council is responsible for negotiating international treaties, the Commission is in charge
of implementing the community elements of these treaties. The Commission, however, also
enjoys a power of initiative and often designs the treaties. This is especially the case of the 
EU-ACP agreements, which the Commission’s DG Dev and, since the Cotonou Agreement,
DG Trade are in charge of managing and implementing.  
7 The Council actually wanted to add ‘good governance’ to the list of essential elements, but 
was opposed here by the ACP countries that felt that the three essential elements already 
covered the most important aspects of good governance and that its inclusion could lead to
arbitrary decisions. Good governance, therefore, is a ‘fundamental element’, i.e. with the 
exception of serious cases of corruption, a state facing governance problems will be offered
support and advice to improve its performance. Council of the European Union, Partnership 
Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
of the One Part, and the European Community, of the Other Part, signed in Cotonou on 
23 June 2000 and revised in 2005 (Cotonou Agreement), article 9(3). 
development–good governance–security triangle by underlining that the agreement
was concluded ‘with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting
a stable and democratic political environment’,8 thus emphasising the third 
dimension – security. 
The real innovation in the Cotonou Agreement, however, is the introduction of a
‘political dialogue’ between the EU and the ACP in article 8,9 which should 
‘contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic
political environment’. After five years of implementation and some criticism, the
mid-term revision of the Cotonou Agreement, in 2005, allowed for some adjust-
ments. It was thought, in particular, that the preventive dimension of the ‘political
dialogue’ as defined in article 8 was underused. Under the revised Cotonou
Agreement, the dialogue should be held before the consultation procedure 
provided by article 96 10 of the same agreement can be launched. This amendment
clearly strengthens the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement, while the
provision for a systematic dialogue with each partner country in effect 
complements the work of the EU special representatives (EUSR) sent to troubled
regions and thus draws a link with the CFSP dimension of the EU’s relations with
Africa.11 The assistance provided to partner countries is increasingly political rather
than purely technical and the concept of rule of law clearly drives some of the
reforms advocated in the Cotonou Agreement.12
The principles set in the Cotonou agreement are accompanied by more concrete
policies and instruments. The European Commission classifies its conflict prevention
IDS WORKING PAPER 284
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8 Cotonou Agreement, op. cit., article 1.
9 ‘Article 8 – Political dialogue: (1) The Parties shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, 
balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commitments on both sides. […] (3) […] 
Through dialogue, the Parties shall contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a 
stable and democratic political environment. It shall encompass cooperation strategies as 
well as global and sectoral policies, including environment, gender, migration and questions 
related to the cultural heritage. (4) The dialogue shall focus, inter alia, on specific political 
issues of mutual concern or of general significance for the attainment of the objectives of
this Agreement, such as the arms trade, excessive military expenditure, drugs and organised 
crime, or ethnic, religious or racial discrimination. The dialogue shall also encompass a 
regular assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, 
democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance. (5) Broadly based policies to 
promote peace and to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts shall play a prominent 
role in this dialogue, as shall the need to take full account of the objective of peace and 
democratic stability in the definition of priority areas of cooperation. 
10 An Article 96 procedure can be launched if a party to the agreement – the European 
Community and the member states of the European Union or an ACP state – considers 
that the other party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human 
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. This consultation procedure can lead to the
adoption of ‘appropriate measures’ and, as a last resort, to a suspension of the agreement 
(Mackie and Zinke 2005). 
11 The EUSRs promote the CFSP in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in 
efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. They report to the Secretary-
General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR). 
12 Reforms in the public sector, in particular, should range from modernisation of legal systems
to decentralisation, Cotonou Agreement, op. cit., article 33. 
and peace-building efforts into two categories: direct and indirect initiatives. Direct
initiatives range from humanitarian activities to support for conflict resolution 
initiatives and institutional reforms, while indirect initiatives refer to the 
mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes, from
development to trade. 
Among direct initiatives are the humanitarian actions led by DG ECHO.13
Humanitarian action is a shared competence, but it is implemented by the
Commission’s institutions, and more precisely by DG ECHO, which enjoys an
important latitude within the Commission, while its impartiality is established in
article 7 of the humanitarian aid regulation.14 In fact, the policies managed by
ECHO are far from politicised. DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian assistance as
an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity: DG ECHO is not part of the ‘crisis 
management’ system and is therefore not a crisis management instrument, as the
humanitarian policy does not aim to stabilise a political situation nor to prevent a
crisis and can therefore not be considered a political instrument.
Direct initiatives also comprise early warning and action mechanisms. The
Commission, its geographic desks and in-country delegations, are asked to closely
monitor the political situation in all countries to deliver assessments based on a list
of root causes of conflict.15 These assessments are then used, by the General
Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, to prepare a watch-list of countries
at the start of each Presidency. In addition, risk factors are to be taken into account
during the drafting of the Commission’s Country Strategy Papers16 so as to ensure
a coordinated approach to conflict prevention. The Crisis Management and Conflict
Prevention Unit, within the Commission’s Directorate General External Relations
(DG Relex), played an instrumental role in the introduction of these conflict 
assessments and in the integration of risk factors in the Country Strategy Papers.
More importantly, however, the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit is
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13 The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was created within DG Dev in 
1992. In 1996, the Council defined the legal foundations of ECHO’s action, thus establishing 
the principle of independent humanitarian action, while ECHO became an independent DG
in 2004. 
14 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid. The 
principal instruments for immediate EU humanitarian relief are EC humanitarian aid 
delivered under this regulation and the member states’ capabilities mobilised under the EC
Civil Protection Mechanism, as established by the Council decision 2001/792/EC of 23 
October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in 
civil protection assistance interventions.
15 Root causes are listed under eight headings: legitimacy of the state; rule of law; respect for
fundamental rights; civil society and media; relations between communities and dispute-
solving mechanisms; sound economic management; social and regional inequalities; 
geopolitical situation. European Commission, Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict,
European Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/
cpcm/cp/list.htm (accessed on 10 March 2007).
16 Each Country Strategy Paper (CSP) is drafted during negotiations between the European 
Commission and the concerned country’s government and thereafter signed by both parties.
It provides a framework for European Commission assistance programmes under the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement for periods of five years. 
in charge of coordinating and mainstreaming the Commission’s conflict prevention
and management activities. As part of DG Relex, it also provides the necessary link
between the Commission’s institutions in charge of conflict prevention and 
management and their Council counterparts.17
Two supplementary, more technical tools, complement the ‘early warning and
action’ system. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), now managed by the RRM
management unit within the Commission’s DG Relex, has been used since 2001 to
quickly bring a host of measures to bear on a conflict situation. The RRM can only
finance a non-humanitarian operation where other instruments cannot respond
within the necessary time frame, and for no longer than 6 months.18 A specific
budget line, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),
which is managed by the Commission’s DG EuropeAid,19 also finances both 
election observation missions and thematic actions, such as training, media, civic
and voter education, generally conducted by partner NGOs and international
organisations (European Commission 2001).20
Indirect initiatives essentially focus on the acknowledgement and integration of
security concerns within other policy fields, such as development and trade. The
Commission thus acknowledges that development and trade policies need to be
carefully designed and implemented if they are to both provide economic
prosperity and ensure political stability. Of particular significance here are the
efforts to regulate the trade of particular goods fuelling violent conflicts. The
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,21 that aims to prevent the trade of
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17 The Commission’s representative within the Council’s Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) and the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) is a member
of the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit. 
18 The RRM was previously managed by the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit. 
It was mobilised in 2002, for example, to support ECOWAS mediation efforts in Côte 
d’Ivoire. EUR500,000 was granted to finance the establishment of an ECOWAS secretariat
and mediation meetings in Abidjan, as well as a mediation conference in Abuja. Another
EUR730,000 was given for the reestablishment of a radio station in Liberia that would 
provide balanced programming relevant for the transition process. See the Commission’s 
website on the RRM: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/rrm/index.htm
(accessed on 10 March 2007). 
19 DG EuropeAid is assisted in this by the Human Rights and Democracy Committee, which is 
comprised of member-states’ representatives and is chaired by a representative of DG 
Relex. It examines financial planning and delivers opinions on projects over EUR1 million. 
See the Commission’s website on the EIDHR: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eidhr/
eidhr_en.htm (accessed on 11 March 2007). 
20 On the RRM and EIDHR, as well as other Community instruments for civilian crisis 
management used both in Africa and other regions, see Gourlay (2006a). The Instrument 
for Stability, established in November 2006, repeals, in particular, the Council Regulation 
(EC) 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid reaction mechanism.
21 The EU has been a participant of the Kimberley Process since its inception. The scheme is 
implemented through a Council Regulation applicable in all member-states, which lays 
down the procedures and criteria to be followed in the import and export of rough 
diamonds into and from the EU and sets out provisions for self-regulation by the European 
diamond industry. The European Commission actively supported the setting-up of the 
monitoring system and chairs the Kimberley Process this year.
so-called ‘blood diamonds’, and the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance and Trade (FLEGT),22 which regulates the trade of timber, are two
cases in point. The EU’s efforts do not stop with its import activities, however:
Europe has also shown signs that it was ready to take responsibility as an exporting
region, especially with regard to weapons. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement
underlines the partners’ willingness to address the issue of landmines and the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW).23
2.2 The EC, a unified actor?
The intermingling of fields in conflict prevention and management policies requires
close coordination between the different branches of the Commission. In fact,
unclear divisions of labour are problematic inside the Commission, between its 
different sectors and directorates general (DGs). In the name of mainstreaming, DG
Trade and DG Dev are asked, for instance, to carefully take into account the conflict
prevention precautions pointed out by DG Relex. It is obvious, however, that these
DGs often pursue different, or even contradictory, objectives. DG Trade will want
to defend the EU’s commercial interests, DG Relex will be careful to increase the
EU’s security, external relations and international visibility, while DG Dev should
contribute to increased prosperity in the ACP states. 
The EU’s current commitment in favour of regional integration illustrates the 
difficulty of coordinating and reconciling these different objectives. While African
sub-regional organisations are increasingly considered key in the African security
architecture and the strengthening of their conflict prevention and management
capabilities is increasingly supported, the Cotonou Agreement foresees the 
establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and
ACP regional organisations. At first sight, these two objectives would seem 
consistent. Some observers, however, underline that they may lead to very 
contradictory results. The official rationale behind the EPAs is to enhance regional
integration in the ACP so as to integrate the economies of the ACP countries into
the world economy. One of the principal aims of these EPAs, however, is also to
submit EU-ACP trade relations to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, and to
suppress the non-reciprocal trade arrangements that long prevailed between the
EU and the ACP. External observers and representatives of the ACP states have
already, on numerous occasions, underlined the risks entailed by a rushed-in 
liberalisation and regionalisation of trade in the ACP countries (Gibb 2000;
Ochieng 2005). The trade liberalisation entailed by the EPAs may indeed create
more ground for conflict than is openly admitted: the changes in commodity prices
that it triggers can exacerbate livelihood insecurity, while making it more difficult to
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22 The Action Plan places particular emphasis on forest governance reforms and capacity 
building in timber-producing countries. FLEGT actions should also aim at developing multi-
lateral cooperation to reduce the consumption of illegally harvested timber in the EU 
(European Commission 2003). 
23 Efforts to regulate the trade of arms, however, remain tentative: the Council adopted a 
code of conduct on arms exports in 1998, but this is not a legally binding instrument and 
European member-states are among the world’s largest arms suppliers (Hugues 2006).
control the flow of arms or conflict resources. The EC’s willingness to pursue EPA
negotiations in spite of these objections casts some doubt on its capacity to 
reconcile its different interests and institutions. 
The Community pillar is not, finally, exempt from the interplay of national interests.
Member-states, and France in particular,24 do not hesitate to emphasise their
contribution to the European Development Fund (EDF) within the EDF
Committee25 to favour the one or the other programme. They can also push 
forward their national interests through the presence of their European civil 
servants within the Commission. Belgian European civil servants, for instance, are
important actors in the EU policy in Africa26 and can sometimes be seen, especially
within DG Dev, as promoting Belgium’s national interests.
3 African security, a field for testing 
out for the European Security and
Defence Policy?
A number of documents and instruments adopted over the last few years illustrate
the second pillar’s growing interest in and concern for Africa’s security problems, as
well as its desire to become increasingly involved in their resolution. A major step
was made with the adoption, in May 2001, of the Council Common Position 
concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.27 This common
position developed at length an element that would thereafter constitute one of
the essential bases of the EU’s security strategy in Africa, i.e. the idea of an
increased multilateralism through a strengthening both of the capabilities of African
regional organisations and of the EU’s partnership with these organisations and
with the United Nations (UN). This principle of multilateral cooperation is also
emphasised in the European Security Strategy. 
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24 France has traditionally been the very first contributor to the EDF – its contribution 
represented 24.3 per cent of the 9th EDF (2003–2008). This is about to change, however, 
as Germany will be the first contributor to the 10th EDF (2008–2013), while France’s share 
will drop to 19.5 per cent.
25 The EDF Committee consists of member-state representatives and meets every two 
months in order to give an opinion on the programmes proposed by the Commission. 
26 Within European institutions, Belgians are often in charge of African Affairs, in the General 
Secretariat as well as in the Commission, especially in the DG Dev. 
27 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2001/374/CFSP concerning 
conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, 14 May 2001. This Common 
Position was thereafter repealed by the Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 
26 January 2004 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, which 
was in turn repealed by the Council Common Position 2005/304/CFSP of 12 April 2005 
concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. In the latter, EU 
member-states are called upon to coordinate their bilateral action in order to support the 
African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations. 
Although all these documents in theory provide a clear framework that could
enhance the coordination of the European member-states’ activities in Africa, most
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) proposals still lack a practical
translation. The clearest signs of the latter are the appointments of special 
representatives of the EU or of the Presidency to specific parts of Africa,28 but
these appointments are still made on an ad hoc basis and cannot, therefore, be
interpreted as a systematic ‘diplomaticisation’ of the EU’s presence in Africa. The
CFSP therefore remains highly inconsistent, which partly accounts for the fact that
the EU has increasingly invested in the development of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP), perceived as a more straightforward policy field. 
3.1 Africa, a field of validation for the CFSP/ESDP means and 
procedures
The field of conflict prevention and management in Africa constitutes an ideal field
for testing out and validating (Bagayoko 2004a) in particular the Petersberg tasks,
which comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.29 Operation
Artemis,30 launched within the ESDP framework and led from June to September
2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was clearly a founding act in the
mobilisation of the second pillar instruments in Africa (Olsen 2002; Faria 2004).
The experimentation field of the ESDP had until then not expanded beyond the
Balkans. Beyond this geographic expansion of the potential field of intervention,
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28 Mr Aldo Ajello holds the position of EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region 
since March 1996, Mr Pekka Haavisto was appointed EUSR for Sudan in July 2005, while 
Mr Hans Dahlgren’s mandate as the Presidency’s special representative for the Mano River
region has been regularly renewed since 2001. 
29 The Petersberg tasks were defined in the Petersberg Declaration, adopted by the Western 
European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers on 19 June 1992, as the role of the 
organisation was redefined. The part of this Declaration where the Petersberg tasks are 
defined was then integrated word for word into article 17.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1997. These tasks thus constitute the legal definition of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). There is a real resolve, within the EU, to broaden the initial scope of the 
Petersberg missions to take on board the new threats to European security and the post-
9/11 international security environment. To that end the draft Constitutional Treaty stipulated
that the Petersberg tasks ‘shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping 
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including 
by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories (Article III-309)’. 
However, since the Constitutional Treaty has not been ratified by all EU member states, the 
scope of the Petersberg tasks remains that defined in the Nice Treaty. Nevertheless, the 
extended Petersberg missions as defined by the draft Constitutional Treaty are being 
implemented de facto, as is shown in the assistance provided to the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). See Assembly of Western European Union, The Petersberg missions, 
Assembly Factsheet no. 4, February 2007, www.assembly-weu.org/en/
documents/Fact%20sheets/Fact%20Sheet%204E%20Petersberg%20missions.pdf?PHPSES
SID=f3137d60... (accessed on 10 March 2007).
Operation Artemis also inaugurated a new form of partnership between the EU
and the UN.31
More importantly, however, the new EU military structures gained legitimacy both
from an external and an internal perspective:
l First, Artemis proved that the EU was able to plan military operations 
autonomously, without resorting to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
means and instruments.32 The operation was indeed entirely and exclusively 
planned within the EU’s military structures – the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS) – which then worked in close coordination 
with France, the ‘framework nation’ in charge of operational planning. An 
alternative to the resort to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in 
Europe (SHAPE) was thus successfully tested. Africa is now often seen by ESDP
actors as a field of European influence that could escape the strict imple-
mentation of the ‘Berlin Plus’ option33 and where the ESDP could gain 
increasing international credibility;
l Artemis also provided the ESDP with an increased legitimacy within the EU 
institutional architecture. Operation Artemis established that the decision 
procedures at the politico-military level – which depend on the relations 
between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military 
Committee – could lead to rapid decisions, contrary to what had been 
suggested by the long planning delays for Operation Concordia.34
Operation Artemis also paved the way for conceptual innovations, such as the joint
proposal by France and the UK – joined by Germany – to develop a new 
‘battlegroup concept’, i.e. the creation of battlegroups of about 1,500 troops with
the appropriate supporting units,35 able to intervene anywhere and more 
particularly in ‘collapsing states’. These battlegroups are again meant to be part of
the EU-UN partnership.36 They are also seen as a potential experimentation field
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30 Launched on 12 June 2003, Operation Artemis aimed to prevent a humanitarian 
catastrophe in Ituri, in the North East of the Democratic Republic of Congo, then torn up 
by the violent fighting opposing the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The operation was 
thus explicitly mandated by the UN’s Security Council (Resolution 1484) in order to maintain
the security in the camps hosting the internally displaced, secure the airport in Bunia and 
protect civilians, UN staff and humanitarian agencies in the region. The aim was to ensure 
the control of the situation while the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the DRC
(MONUC) was reinforced and its strength increased. 
31 See the EU-UN Joint Declaration of 24 September 2003 on cooperation in crisis
management.
32 As shown by its ongoing support to the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS), NATO has however
since stepped up its interest and expertise in Africa, which tends to qualify this idea that 
Africa could constitute an ideal field for the experimentation of an autonomous European 
defence. 
33 Berlin Plus is a strategic partnership agreement between NATO and the EU. It allows the 
EU to make use of NATO’s logistical and planning means in its crisis management activities. 
34 Operation Concordia took place in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) 
from 31 March to 15 December 2003. 
for the concept of ‘differentiated integration’ (Irondelle and Vennesson 2002),
which would enable willing states to intervene without being paralysed by internal
differences within the EU. 
Finally, Operation Artemis gave way to other ESDP operations which consolidated
the EU’s contribution to peace and post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC. Two
subsequent missions were indeed launched in the DRC, this time with a Security
Sector Reform (SSR)37 focus. EUPOL Kinshasa is a police mission in the capital city
Kinshasa, which contributes to the training of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU).38
EUSEC DR Congo, on the other hand, provides assistance and advice on the 
necessary reforms to the Congolese authorities in charge of security since June
2005. Another military operation, finally, recently confirmed the EU’s capacity to
lead an efficient, albeit short-term, mission with a clear objective. EUFOR DR
Congo was deployed in Kinshasa from 12 June to 30 November 2006, during the
period encompassing the elections in the DRC.39 All three missions in the DRC
were or are led in very close coordination with the UN – EUFOR, like Artemis,
was meant as a support to MONUC – and the Congolese authorities. A fifth 
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35 In response to a crisis, or to an urgent request by the UN, the EU should be able to under-
take two battlegroup-size operations for a period of up to 120 days simultaneously. Forces 
should be on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the 
operation. Larger member states will generally contribute their own battlegroups, while 
smaller members are expected to create common groups. Each group will have a 
‘framework nation’, which will take operational command, based on the model set up 
during the Operation Artemis.
36 The battlegroups will be – although not exclusively – available for autonomous operations, 
in response to UN requests for participation in Chapter VII operations. The European battle-
group concept is therefore developed in coordination with the UN Standby High Readiness 
Brigade (SHIRBRIG) initiative, which plans for brigade-type forces intended for Chapter VI 
operations. They may also contribute to the rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF).
37 Taking as a basis the guidelines set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the EU has now defined the security sector as a system which 
includes: the core security actors, i.e. armed forces, police, gendarmeries and paramilitary 
forces, intelligence and security services; the security management and oversight bodies 
within the executive and legislative branches and in civil society; the justice and law 
enforcement institutions; and the non-statutory forces such as liberation or guerrilla armies,
private security companies and political party militias. Security Sector Reform (SSR) seeks to 
increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs
in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, 
human rights, transparency and the rule of law. SSR involves addressing issues of how the 
security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled. See the EU
Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) submitted by the Council 
General Secretariat to the Political and Security Committee on 13 October 2005 and the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – A 
Concept for European Community support for security sector reform of 24 May 2005, 
which together constitute the EU Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform adopted by 
the Council in June 2006. 
38 EUPOL Kinshasa was launched in April 2005 and its mandate was recently extended until 
30 June 2007. It counts approximately 30 staff members. 
39 EUFOR included 1,200 troops in Kinshasa and as many in neighbouring Gabon, ready to be 
deployed in the event of a crisis. 
mission, led in Darfur (Sudan), was meant to show that the EU is also able to
implement at the operational level its partnership with the AU. The EU civilian-
military supporting action to AMIS II, the AU’s mission in Darfur, provides the AU
with political, military and technical assistance, military observers, equipment,
strategic transportation and training.40 In 2004 the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) Action Plan for Africa 41 was adopted, which sets out practical 
recommendations for the implementation of the EU’s contribution to Africa’s 
security. 
The last EU operations in Africa illustrate a major trend in ESDP operations: the
increasing development of civilian means, thus giving a practical dimension to the
civilian side of the ESDP.42 The introduction of civilian dimensions has led to the
transformation of the type of EU involvement in Africa. While the development of
ESDP activities in Africa was initially meant to provide rapid reaction means, these
operations are in effect increasingly taking on a long-term approach (Gowan 2004)
– EUSEC DR Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa have now already exceeded 18 months.
This ‘civilianisation’ of the ESDP in Africa has important implications for inter-
institutional coordination. It requires, first, close coordination between the military
and civilian dimensions of ESDP operations, a coordination made more difficult by
their separate management by different institutions and funding instruments within
the second pillar.43 Second, while the military dimension of the ESDP is a second
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40 In October 2006, the EU personnel deployed to AMIS II included 29 officers, 17 military 
experts and 10 military observers. In addition, 3 military staff, 1 police officer and 1 political 
advisor were deployed to Addis Ababa to support the EU Special Representative for Sudan, 
Pekka Haavisto, in his contacts with the AU. The mission also planned for 3 officers to be 
sent to the Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (Al Fasher). See Factsheet: EU Support to 
the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS), October 2006, http://consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cmsUpload/061017factsheet5AMISII.doc.pdf (accessed on 03 March 2007). 
41 This document, adopted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 16 November
2004, sets out the following recommendations: provision of technical advice, liaison officers
to be sent to the AU and to the sub-regional organisations, database of African officers 
trained by EU member states in Europe or in Africa, expert teams responsible for
supporting the planning of operations led by the AU and the sub-regions, training by EU 
staffs of African military and civilians in DDR, etc. See Council of the European Union, 
Action Plan for ESDP support to peace and security in Africa, 16 November 2004. 
42 Although many tend to focus on the military side of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) only, this policy also has an important civilian crisis management side. The EU 
has actually made faster operational progress in this so-called ‘soft’ dimension of crisis 
management than in the military one which initially was seen as a priority in the 
development of an EU crisis response (see Nowak 2006). 
43 While the military side of the ESDP is essentially conceptualised and implemented by the 
EU Military Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS), its civilian side is managed by the
Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). A civilian-military cell was 
created within the EUMS in 2004 to enhance civilian-military coordination in crisis 
management operations: this cell is, however, only responsible for coordination within the 
second pillar. The civilian and military aspects of the ESDP are also financed separately: the 
civilian aspects are covered by the CFSP budget or additional financial instruments such as 
the African Peace Facility, while military expenditures are managed by a special mechanism 
called ‘Athena’. See Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a 
mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of the European Union 
operations having military or defence implications (ATHENA).
pillar exclusivity, its civilian dimension is necessarily linked to – and, at times, 
overlaps with – the community pillar’s civilian activities. 
3.2 Unclear division of labour within the second pillar
The European security structures are very young44 and are therefore all struggling
for legitimacy. This legitimacy must be won: first, against external actors, such as
NATO (and particularly the US interests within it); second, against older and more
experienced EC institutions; third, one against another. The Political and Security
Committee (PSC), composed of the member-states’ PSC ambassadors, plays a 
central role in the definition and follow-up of European crisis responses. It provides
the political control and strategic direction for the ESDP operations, basing its 
decisions on the recommendations expressed by the Military Committee (EUMC)
and the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). The EUMC
is composed of the member-states’ military commands; it follows the progress of
military operations, makes recommendations to the PSC on all military aspects of
the ESDP and gives instructions to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). CIVCOM was 
created in 2002 to define and supervise civilian operations. It is also in charge of
seeing to the inter-pillar coordination of the EU’s civilian actions. 
To these Council institutions must be added the General Secretariat of the Council
(GSC), led by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High
Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR), with its directorates general. Among them,
the DGE, in charge of external relations, is divided into geographical and functional
directorates. The responsibility to coordinate the management of African security
issues is at the heart of a competition. If DGE VIII – in charge of defence issues –
were tasked with coordinating the activities in Africa, it could gain renewed 
legitimacy. Indeed, the DGE VIII is currently having some difficulties in imposing its
views on the Military Staff, also located within the GSC. Moreover, both DGE VIII
and the Military Staff are also competing with NATO. Because the ESDP is 
comprised of two closely interlinked fields – military and civilian crisis management
– the recently established civilian-military cell could also seek the responsibility of
trying to coordinate the civilian and military aspects of the EU security policy in
Africa. Nevertheless, DGE IX, which is in charge of the civilian aspects of crisis 
management45 and has no rivalry with NATO, is perhaps in a better position at the
moment: indeed, DGE IX seems to be getting closer and closer to the Commission
services – such as DG Dev or DG ECHO – in charge of implementing civilian 
programmes in the security field. 
Finally it is also important to stress the role played by professional interests, which
have appeared since the launching of the ESDP. In fact, a new profession has
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44 The ESDP was launched during the June 1999 European Council held in Cologne and was 
declared operational in the December 2001 European Council held in Laeken. 
45 The following therefore report to DGE IX: the Police Unit, which plans and leads crisis 
management missions comprising a police deployment; the Policy Planning and Early 
Warning Unit (Policy Unit), an instrument of strategic and geopolitical analysis at the service
of the High Representative for the CFSP; and the Situation Centre (SITCEN), in charge of
24-hour intelligence, analysis and warning. 
emerged within the traditionally civilian organisation that the EU used to be. The
military officers stationed in Brussels are trying to promote both their values (such
as symbolic patriotism) and their working methods (such as a culture of planning) as
opposed to those of their civilian counterparts (Bagayoko 2006). Whatever their
nationality, they generally feel they have more in common with their military 
counterparts from other countries than with the European civil servants coming
from their own country. 
4 African security, a field of 
Europeanisation for member-
states security policies?
African security issues offer an interesting field, where European member-states
can make their security policies meet, interact, coordinate, and in effect,
‘Europeanise’. C. Major defines Europeanisation as ‘an ongoing, interactive and
mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels, where
the responses of the member-states to the integration process feed back into EU
institutions and policy processes and vice versa’ (Major 2005). Through its security
policy in sub-Saharan Africa, the EU indeed aims to ‘integrate the policies and
actions of its member-states’ (Ginsberg 1989). But the launching of a dynamic
ESDP in Africa is also the symptom of the Europeanisation strategies of the former
colonial powers’ traditional African policies and of their capacity to be the driving
force for a collective policy on the continent. 
4.1 EU member-states and African security
Traditionally, most EU member-states do not identify any significant political or
economic interest in Africa. Germany, in particular, has long insisted on the 
necessity to limit the ESDP to the enlarged European space and been hostile to
the idea of any EU involvement in the management of Africa’s conflicts. But the
former colonial powers have been successful in the recent years in generating a
growing interest for African security matters among their European partners. 
Rather than being a driving force, France has long been an obstacle to the EU’s 
further involvement in African security issues. France’s unilateralist policy in Africa
acted as a disincentive on other European states, which were reluctant to associate
their image and the image of the EU with a policy often considered neo-colonial.
France, however, is now increasingly trying to obtain a multilateral legitimacy for its
interventions on the continent. The integration of French interventions within the
ESDP framework could allow it to remain involved on the African continent – still
considered a central asset for France’s position on the international scene – while
rendering groundless the accusations of paternalism and neo-colonialism. Operation
Artemis offered an interesting illustration of the progressive Europeanisation of
France’s involvement in African crises46 and proved that European member-states
could decide collectively to contribute to a crisis management operation that had
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been initially wanted by one of them only. Operation Artemis was thus an 
interesting synthesis of the interests of the EU and one of its member-states, since
it reconciled a young ESDP in search of credibility and a former colonial power in
search of legitimacy after some deeply contested unilateral interventions. It also
enabled France to re-engage in the Great Lakes region and beyond, in Central
Africa, from which it had progressively withdrawn since the much criticised
Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. Finally, and beyond these central political issues,
the Europeanisation of its Africa policy also enables France to share the costs of
military and defence cooperation. This desire to rationalise the costs of the French
military cooperation first translated into the efforts expended since 1998 towards
the emergence of inter-African capabilities of crisis management. This was 
essentially done through the Programme for the strengthening of African peace-
keeping capabilities (RECAMP – Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de
la Paix), which is based on a regional approach to assistance and lies at the heart of
the multilateralisation of the French security policy in Africa.47 The objective, 
regularly stressed since 2002, is to make RECAMP ‘the operational reference for
the ESDP in Africa’, i.e. a federative framework for EU member-states’ security
policies in Africa.48 The future of RECAMP is more and more linked to France’s
capacity to convince its European partners to participate in the financing and
equipment as well as training of African armies.
The Franco-British rapprochement in Saint-Malo led to both the creation of the
ESDP and the Europeanisation of the two countries’ African policies, even though
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46 Operation Artemis was not strictly speaking the result of a European initiative; it was in fact
initially a French intervention that was subsequently Europeanised. At the beginning of May
2003, in response to the UN General Secretary’s call, France considered intervening in the 
RDC, at the head of an international coalition. The initial operation, named ‘Mamba’, was 
eventually proposed by the French diplomacy to its European partners and took place 
within the ESDP framework. In accordance with the Council Decision of 12 June 2003, the
operation’s command was entrusted to France, which took on the role of ‘framework 
nation’. In fact, the operational headquarters of Operation Artemis was set up in the 
courtyard of the army’s high command in Paris and benefited from the work that had been
previously achieved by the Centre of Planning and Operational Command (CPCO – Centre 
de planification et de conduite opérationnelle) for Operation Mamba. Constituted by a small 
core of CPCO officers, the Operation’s high command was joined by officers from other
member-states as well as by liaison officers from the EU Military Staff. France also provided
the high command on the ground (see Bagayoko 2004b).
47 As shown by the Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire or recent interventions in Chad and the
Central African Republic, France has departed from its abstentionist attitude of 1995–2002, 
although French engagement is now justified as a way to support African capabilities when 
these need to be complemented. France is also reorganising its military forces permanently 
stationed on the continent according to the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), as defined by the African Union. 
48 In fact, two concurrent options for more effectively developing and fostering the RECAMP 
concept were put forward: some advocated developing the partnership with sub-regional 
organisations and coordinating RECAMP with other bilateral initiatives such as the US 
ACOTA (Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance) programme and the UK African
peacekeeping support programmes; the other option consisted in promoting the 
partnership with the AU and the EU’s involvement. In September 2005, during his 
traditional annual speech to the French ambassadors, President Jacques Chirac clarified the 
French position and called for RECAMP to be placed within the European framework. 
the UK has since seemed less anxious than France to Europeanise its African policy.
Since 2001, the United Kingdom’s efforts to develop African peacekeeping 
capabilities – through British Peace Support Teams (BPST) which are providing
training in former British colonies – have become part of a much more ambitious
conflict prevention project, known as the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP).49
The thematic focus of the ACPP, from enhancing peace support operations 
capabilities to addressing the economic and financial causes of conflict, underlines a
holistic understanding of conflict prevention. The UK has placed a strong emphasis
on African peacekeeping by setting up a special fund, the Africa Pool.50 The UK
highly values its bilateral activities in Africa. Unlike the French, the British are not
worried when their activities do not have a European label: their approach is less
institutional than the French one. At this stage, the British consider that their
bilateral programmes in Africa are very efficient, particularly in the SSR field, and
therefore do not need to be Europeanised. 
Portugal is also an important European actor in Africa. Since the early 1990s, it has
been developing technical and military cooperation with African Portuguese-
Speaking countries (PALOP). Portugal also has its own African peacekeeping 
capabilities support programme, the Programme for the support of Peace Missions
in Africa (PAMPA – Programa de Apoio às Missões de Paz em África). Like France,
Portugal would like the PAMPA programme to be integrated in the EU training
policy framework. Portugal, however, does not wish the programme to be fully
Europeanised. 
EU member-states seem increasingly convinced of the importance of Africa to
European security. The rather impressive list of contributing nations to EUFOR RD
Congo confirms this.51 Moreover, some member-states such as the Netherlands or
Sweden have in effect recently stepped up their involvement in African security
issues.52 Alongside France and Portugal, Belgium – which recently resumed a more
active Africa policy after having largely withdrawn from the African scene following
the assassination of ten of its parachutists in Kigali in 1994 53 – is one of the most
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49 The ACCP is an interdepartmental mechanism which draws together the conflict-
prevention resources of the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD).
50 A key part of the UK’s long-term strategy to build African conflict management capabilities 
consists in supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects. The largest British 
commitment in SSR is in Sierra Leone, where the UK actively supports the reform of the 
army, the police, the judiciary system, as well as ad hoc institutions such as the Anti-
Corruption Commission, the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
and provides technical assistance to the government of Sierra Leone (see Leboeuf 2005).
51 The following EU member-states contributed to EUFOR: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. 
Turkey, although not an EU-member, is also among the contributing nations. See Factsheet:
List of contributing nations to EUFOR RD Congo, General Secretariat of the Council 
website, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Listofcontributingnationsto
EUFORRDCongo.pdf (accessed on 03 March 2007). 
52 On the latter’s involvement in Africa, see Wohlgemuth (2002).
active supporters of a substantial European commitment in Africa. It is followed on
this by Spain and Greece.
4.2 Disagreements between member-states
Germany’s position has considerably evolved, over the last years, from reluctance to
a readiness to contribute to short-term ESDP missions, such as EUFOR, whose
operational command was provided by Germany. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of
reluctance, especially within the German Ministry of Defence, to engage more in
Africa.54 Germany is also very anxious to prevent the EU from taking a neo-
colonialist turn and imposing its views on its African partners. The new EU 
member-states, which have no traditional African policy nor specific interest in this
geographical area,55 are generally in favour of reinforcing African capabilities in
order to create an autonomous African security system and avoid increasing costs
to the EU. 
Indeed, funding constitutes a central issue. Their limited defence budgets can lead
some countries to favour a European option, in order to see the EU shoulder part
of the cost of their African security policy. Some member-states, such as France or
Portugal, thus share a strong desire to have access to the Community development
cooperation funds, although they are not ready, in exchange for this access to
Community funds, to hand over their management of military cooperation to
Community actors. This preoccupation can explain why their African security 
policies are increasingly trying to promote the linkage between security, 
governance and development, as suggested by the RECAMP concept.56 Other
European partners wish to avoid a situation where some member-states’ African
policies would be funded by the EU, especially by the EC budget. This financial issue
drives Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, which are particularly cautious when
it comes to funding EU security activities in Africa. Most new member-states share
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53 Belgium is particularly active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is a former
Belgian colony. The Belgian Defence Ministry, in cooperation with South Africa, provides 
training support to Congolese troops. Belgium also provided logistical and operational 
training to the Beninese battalion about to be sent to the United Nations Mission to DRC
(MONUC).
54 Germany is essentially interested in three aspects of African affairs: the migration of African
populations to some neighbouring states; natural resources (oil and gas); multinational 
operations on the continent. These operations can offer Germany the opportunity to 
improve its military skills in crisis management and provide it with a new legitimacy and 
credibility in the field, as was shown during the EUFOR operation in Kinshasa (RDC) last 
year. 
55 Nevertheless, some of these new member-states are becoming more active in Africa: for
instance, Poland contributed 150 soldiers to EUFOR (this commitment is linked to the close 
relationship between Poland and German, which commanded the EUFOR mission on the 
ground and provided funding for the strategic transport of Polish troops and for their
logistics). A Hungarian observer was also sent to Darfur and afterwards to the Mali 
Peacekeeping School.
56 See the website of RECAMP 5, www.recamp5.org. 
this financial concern: they wish to see a fair balance between the structural funds
they receive and the development aid dedicated to non-EU states. 
Moreover, countries such as Germany and the Nordic countries favour an ethical
approach (Châtaigner 2004) and consider that development funds should not be
used to finance the ESDP, whose progress they do not consider as crucial as France
does. The UK, on the other hand, is already implementing a policy that clearly puts
the stress on the linkage between security and development. The British position
on the question is therefore not so much driven by ethical concerns as it is by a
reluctance to ‘Europeanise’ a policy that is considered already efficient at the
national level. 
Finally, the issue of multilateral cooperation with other Western actors is another
bone of contention. France’s insistence on involving the EU in Africa can be read as
an attempt to avoid coordination with other actors, and in particular with NATO
and the United States.57 The UK, on the other hand, insists on the necessity of
coordinating EU member-states’ activities with non-European actors such as the
United States, Canada and Norway. The EU strategy for Africa and the G8
Gleneagles Plan for Africa are viewed as totally interconnected. The British, 
followed in this by Germany, also promote cooperation between NATO and 
the EU. 
5 Inter-institutional relations: 
competition or cooperation?
Each and every new policy paper focusing on the EU’s security policy in Africa
insists on the necessity of inter-institutional and inter-pillar coordination and 
mainstreaming. In fact, one of the conditions of success of the European approach
to conflict prevention and management in Africa depends on the EU’s capacity to
overcome the rivalries born out of the different institutions’ desire to play the role
of a ‘lead agency’ on these issues. Some of the strategic choices made by the EU in
Africa therefore depend on the interests of each department involved in the 
continent’s affairs and are often the result of compromises between these 
departments. It appears that competition rather than convergence remains the
main trend in the EU inter-institutional relations (Allison 1971; Halperin and Kanter
1974; Egeberg 1999), although some recent evolutions also show that these 
institutions increasingly share a common vocabulary and approach to African 
security issues. Frequently, the linkage between security, governance and 
development is still at the core of the EU inter-institutional competition. 
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57 For instance, the new ‘maritime section’ of the RECAMP concept that is devoted to 
strengthening African states’ sovereignty over their coastlines, is designed to counter
American influence on offshore oil production in the Gulf of Guinea. 
5.1 Cross-pillars rivalries
The Commission can have a determining influence over the implementation of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the African continent (Krause
2003) – for example through the implementation of CFSP sanctions adopted by
the Council or through the mobilisation of first pillar resources for the imple-
mentation of common actions – but also over the implementation of the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The African Peace Facility (APF) provides an
interesting illustration of the institutional issues at stake in the linkage security-
development: it is a good example of the Commission’s capacity to encroach on the
Council’s prerogative over the CFSP and ESDP. The APF is a funding instrument
dedicated to financing peacekeeping operations led by African actors. Launched in
2004, the APF was funded from the resources of the 9th European Development
Fund (EDF), which is drawn from member-states’ voluntary contributions. Although
the EDF is not part of the Community budget, the Commission is in charge of
managing it, which gives it a determining influence. With regards to the African
Peace Facility itself, however, the member-states have the last word. The APF was
supposed to be a provisional instrument and its perpetuation created heated
debates between member-states and the Commission. Some object that the APF
‘diverts’ funds that were initially meant for development aid towards security 
concerns.58 The issue of the APF also had a concrete impact on the considerable
disagreement between the Commission and the member-states over the notion of
‘effective ownership’ 59 through multilateral cooperation and the terms of its
implementation. The debate, in effect, concerned the type of African multilateral
organisation (see O’Brien 2000) that should be supported. The use of the African
Peace Facility was therefore at the centre of a competition between the
Commission, which wanted the APF to focus on support to the AU,60 and the
GSC and some member-states, which wanted these funds to be also – or even
exclusively – used to support sub-regional organisations.61 This debate found a de
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58 The member-states discussed four options for the future financing of the APF. According to
the first option, which was the one chosen in April 2006, new funds would be allocated to
the APF from the current EDF. The second option offered to finance the APF through the 
CFSP budget under the new financial perspectives for 2007–2013. The role of the 
Commission would at the very least be reduced, while the European Parliament could 
control the use of the facility’s funds as part of its competence in the CFSP budget. The 
third option would lead to the creation of a new multi-annual and intergovernmental fund,
which would be managed either according to the current APF procedure or through the 
ATHENA mechanism, currently used for the EU’s military operations. This type of fund 
would most probably be under the sole control of the member-states. According to the 
fourth option, the part of the APF which focuses on the building of the AU’s capabilities 
could be financed through Commission resources. EU Peacekeeping operations and any 
other types of EU military activity could not, however, be financed within this framework 
and the European Parliament’s control would be limited to the small EU funds provided for
AU activities. 
59 The concept of ‘effective ownership’ – or ‘African ownership’ – refers to the appropriation, 
by African partners, of the EU’s initiatives, in terms of financial and technical assistance and 
training, meant to increase their capabilities in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution. ‘Ownership’ therefore refers to the idea of ‘African solutions to African 
problems’, i.e. that Africans should assume responsibility for their own affairs. 
facto – provisional – conclusion when the AU was called upon to intervene in
Darfur: the EUR200 million, which were earmarked in the initial APF for peace 
support operations, were thus nearly exclusively allocated to the AU missions AMIS
I and II.62 The EU agreed, in April 2006, to provide an additional amount of
EUR300 million under the 10th EDF to be able to continue the APF for another
three-year period (2008–2010).63
Another example of the EU institutional rivalries over African security is the recent
case brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which also
underlines the problems entailed by the unclear division of labour between Council
and Commission. In February 2005, the Commission, in an action against the
Council, accused it of assuming the right to contribute to ECOWAS in the frame-
work of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). For the
Commission, the Council decision affects Community powers in the field of
development aid, since actions against the spread of SALW are already covered by
the Cotonou Agreement and the regional indicative programme (RIP) for West
Africa.64
Finally, it is important to underline that inter-institutional rivalries may sometimes
also originate in philosophical divergences. The position of DG ECHO is a telling
example. As mentioned above, DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian assistance as
an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity: it thus contests that humanitarian 
missions can be considered as an integral part of the ESDP military missions, as
currently defined by the Petersberg tasks. The development of the ESDP has
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60 The Commission underlined that the AU had achieved considerable progress at the 
institutional level, and particularly through the creation of its Peace and Security Council. 
The AU’s Peace and Security Council could be seen as the New Economic Partnership for
Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) security organ. The Commission’s preference for the AU is 
therefore consistent with the link it has been drawing between development and conflict 
prevention and management policies. 
61 The GSC, spurred on by some member-states, favoured the sub-regional organisations and 
more particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which 
actually possessed the necessary operational experience and had started developing the 
adequate institutional framework (see Nivet 2006).
62 The only exceptions here are FOMUC I and II, the missions led by the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC – Communauté Economique et Monétaire 
de l’Afrique Centrale) in the Central African Republic, which received a total of EUR11.38 
million. Figures as of November 2005, Mid Term Evaluation of the African Peace Facility 
Framework Contract, Final Report, 19 January 2006, www.dgroups.org/groups/CoOL/
docs/APF-Evaluation-Final_Report-ECDPM_version_for_ECORYS_190106.pdf (accessed on 
3 March 2007). EUR15 million should also go to AMISOM, the AU’s observation mission in 
Somalia. 
63 Nevertheless, the nature of the final mechanism will certainly depend on the interpretation 
of the Instrument for Stability, launched in November 2006 in order to improve consistency
and coordination between the Community’s short-term and long-term conflict prevention 
and management instruments. Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability.
64 Court of Justice of the European Communities, Action brought on 21 February 2005 by
the European Commission against the Council of the European Union (Case C-91/05).
indeed led some, within ECHO, to fear even greater confusion between 
humanitarian and military actors. These positions explain in large part the near
absence of contacts between DG ECHO and the EUMS, the EUMC or the General
Secretariat’s DGE VIII. DG ECHO rejects the political pressure emanating from the
second pillar institutions and denounces what it thinks is a desire to use 
humanitarian activities for political purposes. 
5.2 Towards increased cooperation?
The current evolution towards longer missions, with a growing civilian dimension –
which are more and more dedicated to promoting good governance and sustain-
able development over the long term – renders essential a tight cooperation
between the civilian and military crisis management activities of the second pillar
and the traditionally civilian activities of the first pillar.65
The GSC, the Commission and the EU member-states have recently engaged in
common reflections on the EU’s policies in the field of African security. A first
important document, the EU Strategy for Africa, was jointly designed by the
Commission and the GSC and adopted in December 2005.66 This document
defines the EU’s general strategy in Africa and therefore goes beyond the sole
security aspects. Nevertheless, the very first section of the document deals with
‘Peace and Security’ and recommends: fostering the African Peace Facility (APF)
through a long-term arrangement; building EU engagement in Africa on member-
states’ bilateral activities; assisting the AU in implementing the African Standby
Force (ASF); providing support to African military and civilian operations (including
the deployment of battlegroups); continuing efforts to fight the production and the
circulation of small arms and involving Africa in the struggle against terrorism.67
This broad document, however, did not give way to any practical implementation. 
In November 2005, following a French request,68 the Political and Security
Committee (PSC) asked the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council
(GSC) to design a Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, 
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65 On this issue of inter-pillar coordination in military and civilian crisis management, see 
Gourlay (2006b), also Kohl (2006). 
66 Council of the European Union, The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership,
adopted by the European Council on 15–16 December 2005. 
67 This strategic cooperation was complemented by a more theoretical work of concept-
ualisation and definition of post-conflict strategies meant to guide future EU policies and 
interventions. The Council has thus developed its own concepts of rule of law and of civilian
administration in 2003. In 2006, two new concepts were jointly defined by the General 
Secretariat of the Council and the Commission: Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In the case of the SSR concept, 
two documents were drafted – one by the GSC, the other by the Commission – and 
thereafter joined under a single cover.
68 The French request directly stemmed from the will to Europeanise the RECAMP concept 
and to involve the EU in the training of African forces. France was very active, throughout 
2006, in lobbying for the definition of this concept. 
management and resolution of conflict. This concept seeks to enhance the 
coordination between the European Community, the second pillar and member-
state activities and promotes three categories of measures: the first category 
comprises measures meant to strengthen consistency and coordination at the EU
level by ensuring coherence between the EU’s different institutions, developing a
support and coordination structure and ensuring consistency of financial support.
The second set of measures focuses on a strengthened partnership with the AU
and the sub-regional organisations. The third group of measures, finally, aims to
strengthen African capabilities by providing support for the training of African
troops; this will probably be done by opening member-states’ depots and by turning
member-states’ training programmes – such as the French RECAMP 69 – into
means for delivering EU policies. The PSC made note of the Concept on 
29 September 2006 70 and stated that it should be seen as part of the 
implementation of the EU strategy for Africa. The GSC and the Commission were
once again invited to explore and find practical ways of implementing the options 
proposed in the paper, in cooperation with African partners. Indeed, a number of
financial and institutional issues remain unresolved, that underline the disagree-
ments that still oppose member-states71 as well as the rivalries within and across
pillars. 
As far as funding is concerned, there is an urgent need to address the absence of
harmonisation of the existing financial tools. At the moment, financial resources
from member-states have to be mobilised to support African capabilities such as
military training, not eligible for funding under the CFSP budget72 or the African
Peace Facility (APF). Some progress has been made since the adoption, in
November 2006, of the ‘instrument for stability’, which aims to ensure a better
linkage between short-term crisis response and long-term development 
instruments. This instrument adopts a comprehensive approach, as it aims to 
contribute to stability in situations of crisis or emerging crisis and to help build local
capacities to address specific global and trans-regional threats and pre- and 
post-crisis situations, often rooted in bad governance and under-development. Its
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69 It is important, here, to stress the fact that the French RECAMP concept is the only 
bilateral programme to be mentioned as such in the concept paper.
70 From July to September 2006, the final version of the concept paper underwent a 
validation process, during which five working groups of the Council – the political-military 
group (PMG), the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group, the Africa working (COAFR) group,
the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM) – were asked to prepare recommendations relating to the concept.
71 There is no obligation, in the concept paper, for member-states to proceed with the 
implementation of the concept.
72 The CFSP budget cannot fund any expenditure of military character: the Treaty on European
Union states that military expenditures are jointly financed by the member-states, but the 
latter do so outside the Community budget and in accordance with the Gross National 
Product scale (Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 28.3, second paragraph). A special 
mechanism called ‘Athena’ has been put in place to manage these expenditures, see Council
Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the 
financing of the common costs of the European Union operations having military or
defence implications (ATHENA).
capacity to solve current funding issues, however, will in great part depend on the
interpretation that the EU institutions choose to make of it. While it clearly 
combines a number of formerly separate instruments,73 it does not as yet provide a
clear perspective on the future of other instruments such as the African Peace
Facility. Article 4(3) of the regulation establishing the instrument for stability would
nonetheless seem to suggest some ways of complementing, if not replacing, the
APF.74 Certainly, this new instrument will be the object of further inter-institutional
negotiations, which will most probably in turn determine its efficiency. Whatever
the results of these negotiations, some problems will remain, however: the status
of military cooperation, in particular, remains unclear. 
The strengthening of the coherence between the EU’s different institutions is also
a problem which will be hard to deal with. Some member-states have proposed
the implementation of a coordination structure that would be both responsible for
coordinating bilateral activities of EU member-states and for planning EU activities
in Africa. The implementation of such a coordination structure is related to the EU
architecture itself: it is interesting to note that a geographical question – security
on the African continent – can create functional development at the EU 
institutional level. At the moment, there is no agreement concerning the 
institutional situation of this structure. France wishes to promote the establishment
of a cell – in effect a European equivalent of the French Military and Defence
Cooperation Directorate (Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défence – DCMD)
– within the GSC, which would be responsible for preparing, coordinating and
implementing EU activities in Africa. Other member-states, such as Portugal or the
UK, are against the establishment of a rigid permanent coordination structure, 
particularly if it is supposed to take initiatives, as the concept paper suggests. They
support the implementation of a lighter mechanism, e.g. a coordination cell 
introduced within the Africa Task Force in the Policy Unit which is already bringing
together all Africa-related activities.75
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73 As far as Africa is concerned, these are: the Action Against Anti-Personnel Landmines in 
Developing Countries (established by Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001); Rapid Reaction Mechanism (established by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001); North-South Cooperation in 
the Campaign Against Drugs and Drug Addictions (established by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2046/97 of 13 October 1997); Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Operations in 
Developing Countries (established by Council Regulation (EC) No 2258/96 of 22 November
1996). 
74 ‘Article 4(3) Pre- and post-crisis capacity building – support for long-term measures aimed 
at building and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional 
organisations, state and non-state actors in relation to their efforts in: (a) promoting early 
warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-
community tensions; (b) improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. Measures under
this point shall include know-how transfer, the exchange of information, risk/threat 
assessment, research and analysis, early warning systems and training. Measures may also 
include, where appropriate, financial and technical assistance for the implementation of
those recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission failing within the 
objectives of Community cooperation policy.’ Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument 
for Stability.
The coordination of member-states training programmes is another issue at stake
here. France would like to make the RECAMP concept an operator for EU 
activities in Africa and extend the ‘framework nation’ concept to African-European
partnerships – France being the natural candidate for this status. This ‘framework
nation’ concept, however, remains to be defined; it is not clear, in particular, how
the strategic direction of activities in Africa would be shared between the ‘frame-
work nation’ and the EU organ in charge of the political control and the strategic
direction of EU operations – namely the PSC. Whereas the UK used to insist on
how important it was for member-states to keep control over their national 
programmes, it now seems more willing to collaborate with France. 
6 Conclusion 
The EU’s security policy in Africa therefore provides an interesting example of the
coordination and competition processes within the Community first pillar and 
within the second pillar and across these pillars. One of the biggest challenges for
the EU policy in Africa will most probably be cross-pillar coordination, i.e. the 
coordination of CFSP/ESDP activities and EC development programmes.
Reconciling their objectives is obviously a matter of close coordination and 
institutional diplomacy.76 The examples of the African Peace Facility and Instrument
for Stability show that devising new instruments alone does not constitute a 
sufficient response to inconsistencies, and that much depends on ad hoc
institutional interpretations and experimentation in the field. Some coordination
issues will remain unresolved as long as the documents defining the EU’s external
relations and security policies and instruments are not clarified and adjusted to the
current international environment and to the EU’s most recent institutional 
evolutions.
It should also be underlined here that the increasing involvement in security issues
of an organisation such as the EU, which had a primarily economic focus, seems to
indicate a new and growing phenomenon on the international scene. This is 
confirmed, for instance, by similar evolutions in Africa, where organisations such as
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), whose original agendas were essentially
driven by economic concerns, are now increasingly involved in conflict 
management.  
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75 The British even go further in insisting that there is no need to create a new coordination 
mechanism since the Political-Military Group is already seen as a ‘clearing house’, even if it 
is not currently acting as such.
76 The practice of negotiation within the EU pertains to a logic that is specific to the EU’s 
governance mode: as shown by Marc Abélès (Abélès 1996; Abélès and Bellier 1996), the 
dominant mode of political exchange at the European level is based on continuous 
negotiations, be they negotiations between the European institutions and external actors 
(states, pressure groups) or internal negotiations between the European institutions’ staffs. 
Above this and more importantly, the EU’s policy in Africa is an interesting case
study in how new international relations concepts – here the linkage between
security, governance and development – can in reality be widely driven by 
institutional issues. Indeed, the linkage between security, governance and 
development, which informs the EU’s current security policies in Africa, largely
relies on institutional dynamics and national interests within the EU. This recently
developed field has the potential to provide for the re-legitimisation of the EC’s
development policies, the experimentation and development of the ESDP and the
Europeanisation of member-states’ Africa and security policies. This three-fold
process, however, also suggests far-reaching institutional ambitions and interests:
African security triggers a competition between the different European institutions,
eager to be the driving force for a policy that can offer some additional resources
and autonomy. Meanwhile, the triangle formed by security, governance and 
development pre-supposes coordination and cooperation between these same
institutions, which are little used to working together. Some of the inconsistencies
observed in the field, when policies are actually implemented, can in turn be
explained by this experimentation process and the inter-institutional dynamics it is
linked to. 
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